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INSTRUMENT FLYING RULES (IFR)-
THE LIABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT
JOHN J. TIGERT*
INTRODUCTION
T HIS ARTICLE concerns the scope of the liability placed upon
the government for aircraft accidents occurring in IFR con-
ditions. It is one of a series being written concerning the liability
of the various members and users of the air traffic system. Although
this article focuses on government responsibilities and liabilities,
it should be noted that use of the system places responsibilities on
everyone involved in it, and many of these responsibilities are over-
lapping!
Because negligence of air traffic controllers presents the greatest
potential liability to the government for accidents occurring dur-
ing IFR operations, the first section of this article discusses the
scope of the duties of air traffic controllers as established by the
applicable Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) operations
manuals. This article assumes that the FAA Administrator has
engaged in a "policy making," as opposed to an "operational,"
activity in prescribing these duties. Therefore, the delineation of
the scope of the duties of air traffic controllers falls within the
"discretionary function" exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Accordingly, courts are not free to impose new or additional duties
in situations where the manuals have prescribed the procedures to
be followed. Of course, courts will inquire whether controllers
exercised "due care" in carrying out their duties regardless of
* J.D., University of Chicago Law School; B.A., Vanderbilt University; Trial
Attorney with the Aviation Section, Torts Branch, of the Civil Division of the
Department of Justice.
For example, the regulatory framework which has evolved in aviation has
placed ultimate responsibility for the operation of an aircraft on the pilot-in-
command. 14 CFR § 91.3 (1978).
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whether the manuals established the procedures to be followed in
a given situation.
Most courts that have addressed the issue of government liability
for controller negligence have implicitly accepted the foregoing
delineation of the controller's duties. Nevertheless, there have been
a half-dozen cases that contain language that the duties of a con-
troller go beyond the provisions of the applicable FAA manuals.
Analysis of these opinions, however, indicates that these courts
have been defining the requirements of due care under the circum-
stances of the specific cases rather than establishing duties beyond
those imposed by the FAA manuals.
The second part of this article concerns the potentially expand-
ing area of governmental liability arising from negligently pre-
pared weather forecasts and discusses the few reported cases in
this area. Although governmental liability resulting from a negli-
gent forecast is arguably precluded by the "misrepresentation"
exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, there are no recent
appellate decisions on this issue. Since 1954, circuit courts have
found it unnecessary to reach the misrepresentation issue because
of lower court findings that the forecasts in question were not
negligently prepared.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE DUTIES OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS
A. Background of the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Air Traffic
System
By the end of World War II the Civil Aeronautics Administra-
tion (CAA), the forerunner of the FAA, had established an air
traffic control network in the United States to provide for the safe
and expeditious handling of instrument flight operations. The CAA
established criteria for the certification of air traffic controllers and
issued various operations manuals which set forth standard pro-
cedures to be followed in the control of air traffic. In addition, it
published the Civil Aeronautics Regulations which established
"rules-of-the-road" to govern all flight operations. Today the pro-
cedures governing controllers are set out in a single FAA manual2
In the past there have been different manuals for en route and terminal con-
trol functions. On January 1, 1976, FAA Order 7110.65 established a single Air
Traffic Control manual to govern all phases of air traffic control. Although this
manual is comprehensive in scope, it is recognized that the controller will be
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and the "rules-of-the-road" are codified as the Federal Aviation
Regulations.'
Early cases involving suits against the United States alleging
negligence on the part of air traffic controllers gave rise to a va-
riety of defenses under the special provisions of the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA).' Such defenses took two principle forms.
First, according to the argument, air traffic control personnel per-
form uniquely governmental functions of a quasi-regulatory na-
ture and the FTCA does not permit suit based upon negligent
performance of these duties because there is no analagous private
liability. Second, it was argued that the "discretionary function" ex-
ception5 of the FTCA would be a bar to recovery even conceding
controller negligence."
These defenses were soon rejected by the courts.' The rationale
against allowing governmental immunity based on the above de-
fenses was set forth succintly by the Supreme Court in the land-
mark case of Indian Towing Co., Inc. v. United States.8 In Indian
Towing, the plaintiffs brought suit for damage to the cargo of a
vessel that ran aground as a result of the alleged negligence of
the Coast Guard in failing to insure the adequate performance of
a lighthouse beacon used by the plaintiffs as a navigational aid. The
Supreme Court held that once the Coast Guard exercised its dis-
cretion in establishing a lighthouse, it was obligated to use due
care in operating it or to give warnings to potential users in the
event the light was not functioning properly.
confronted with situations not covered by it. Accordingly, Paragraph 1 instructs
controllers to use their "best judgment" under such circumstances.
3 These Federal Aviation Regulations (F.A.R.) have been codified in the Code
of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), Title 14, which deals with aeronautics and space.
See 14 C.F.R. §5 1-1260 (1978).
428 U.S.C. 55 1346, 2671-2680 (1976). An understanding of the special op-
eration and requirements of the FTCA is a prerequisite to suing successfully the
United States in an aviation case. The standard handbook in this field is JAYSON,
HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS: ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES
(1977).
128 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976).
' See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.
1955), afl'd sub nom., United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955),
and Air Transp. Assoc. v. United States, 221 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1955).
'See generally Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.
1955), afl'd sub. nor., United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955),
and Air Transp. Assoc. v. United States, 221 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1955).
8350 U.S. 61 (1955).
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From our vantage point almost a quarter of a century later, the
approach established by Indian Towing seems simple and logical.
At the time, however, the scope of the liabilities created by the
FTCA was still being shaped by the courts and there was consider-
able authority for the proposition that there could be no govern-
ment liability arising from operations which were uniquely govern-
mental. The treatment of Indian Towing in the lower courts, and
the dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court provides a prime
example of this approach. The government prevailed in the trial
court on a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the FTCA did
not contemplate liability for the negligent maintenance of a light-
house. This dismissal was affirmed," per curiam, by the Fifth Cir-
cuit and then affirmed" by the Supreme Court which divided
equally on the issue following the initial hearing. It was only on
rehearing that the Court reversed itself by a five to four majority."
Justice Reed's dissenting opinion pointed out that the Indian
Towing decision marked a major departure from precedent estab-
lished less than two years previously in Dalehite v. United States.
1
He reasoned that the liability of governments for the failure of
lighthouse warning lights is as "unknown to tort law" as, for ex-
ample, liability for negligence in fire fighting excluded by the Dale-
hite ruling. " A majority of the court rejected this reasoning, assert-
ing that all activity is "uniquely governmental" when performed by
a government.' Instead, the court found the government liable for
negligent performance at an "operational level" of actions under-
taken as a "good Samaritan.""
B. The Manual Defines the Scope of the Duty
Following the early cases, such as Indian Towing and Eastern
Air Lines," there was no real question of the government's liability
for negligent operation of the air traffic control system. The un-
'211 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1954).
10349 U.S. 902 (1954).
"Indian Towing, Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
"2 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
13 350 U.S. at 75.
14 Id. at 67.
"Id. at 65-68.
"0 Indian Towing, Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) and Eastern Air-
lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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resolved issue concerned the extent of that liability. That is, what
was the scope of the duty owed by the individual controller to
users of the air traffic system?
On this issue the government has taken the position that the
scope of the duties of air traffic controllers is defined by the applic-
able FAA manuals." In recognition of the fact that a manual
cannot anticipate every situation that will confront a controller,
the Forward to the manual states that controllers are to exercise
their best judgment if they encounter situations not covered by it.1
Of course, a controller must exercise due care in carrying out his
duties regardless of whether the manual contemplates a given
situation and establishes specific procedures for handling it.
In essence, the government contends that in situations where
the manual has establishd specific duties and procedures, the courts
are not free to create and impose different ones. The foregoing
position recognizes, however, that it is the function of the "fact
finder" to determine what constitutes "due care" in a given situa-
tion. 9
Most cases that have considered the issue of controller negli-
gence have implicitly accepted this position, the rationale for this
approach being that the determination of the scope of air traffic
control services is a "policy-making," as opposed to an "opera-
tional," decision that falls within the discretionary function excep-
tion of the FTCA."
17 FAA Order 7110.65, supra note 2.
"U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL MANUAL 1 (1978).
19 In many instances, the distinction between the scope of the controller's
duties (established by the manual) and the standard of care (due care) required
in carrying out the duties prescribed in the manual, may seem to be a distinction
without a difference. Analysis of the reported cases indicates, however, that no
court has found a controller negligent for not performing some extra-manual ac-
tion unless the controller was aware of an aircraft's being in a position of danger.
Where controllers have been aware, or should have been aware, that an aircraft
was in a position of danger, courts have uniformly concluded that failure to warn
constituted negligence. Clearly such findings of negligence are based upon a fail-
ure to exercise due care. Thus, it can be generally stated that a finding of con-
troller negligence must rest on a finding that the provisions of the manual were
not followed or that a controller failed to exercise due care when confronted
with a situation where he knew, or should have known, that an aircraft was in
a position of danger.
"See Miller v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 1147 (E.D. Ky. 1974), afl'd, 522
F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1975), for a case where plaintiffs not only alleged that the
controllers failed to follow the provisions of the manual, but also that they should
have performed services beyond those required by the manual. (The controllers
1978]
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C. Is There a Duty Beyond the Requirements of the Manual?
Over a hundred cases have considered the issue of air traffic
controller negligence. Of these, only a half-dozen contain language
that the scope of the duty of air traffic controllers goes beyond
the requirements of the FAA manuals."' Despite such language,
however, an analysis of these cases reveals that these courts have
not actually extended the duty of the controller beyond that re-
quired by the manuals. Rather, they focused on the requirement
of due care' in complying with the provisions of the manual.
Of these cases, one of the earliest and most widely cited is
Hartz v. United States.' Hartz involved wrongful death suits by
the estates of the pilot and a passenger of a Beech Bonanza which
crashed shortly after being cleared to takeoff behind a DC-7 air-
liner. Prior to the crash the pilot of the Bonanza had waited at a
runway intersection as the DC-7 took off in front of it. The tower
controller, in issuing the takeoff clearance to the Bonanza, had
warned, "watch the prop wash!" The parties agreed that the
Bonanza crashed upon encountering wing-tip vortices from the
DC-7. The applicable FAA manual required cautionary warnings
of rotorcraft downwash, thrust stream turbulence, and wing tip
vortices of all kinds, and, further, required that standard phrase-
ology be employed for all such communications. Cautionary in-
formation of this nature was to be phrased, "Caution, turbulence,
departing Eastern DC-7."
The Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court, which had found that
the sole proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the
pilot, and held, upon reconsideration after remand," that the sole
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the con-
were never aware that the aircraft was in a position of danger.) The court con-
cluded that the discretionary function exception of the FTCA provided a com-
plete defense to the second of these allegations.
21 At this point it should be mentioned that although the title of this article
concerns IFR operations, the scope of the duties of air traffic controllers has been
largely decided in cases dealing with wake turbulence and mid-air collisions, in
VFR conditions. Hence these cases are the foundations upon which those dealing
with IFR operations must rest.
2" Controllers have been held to a standard of due care (ordinary care) in
the cases that have specifically considered this issue. Whether a violation of a
provision of the manual constitutes negligence per se or is only evidence of
negligence is, of course, governed by the law of the jurisdiction in question.
23 387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968).
- 415 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1969).
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troller. In its discussion of the controller's duty, the court stated:
"The trial court concluded that no duty existed 'independent of the
duty created by the procedures manual.' We disapprove the view
that the duty of an FAA controller is circumscribed within the
narrow limits of an operations manual and nothing more . . ."'
As authority for this statement the court cited only one appellate
case, Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.," but the cited section of
Ingham is authority only for the Indian Towing concept, that once
a service is undertaken it cannot be performed negligently. Ingham
did not address the issue of whether the duties of controllers go
beyond the requirements of FAA manuals.
The above quoted statement of the Hartz court is clearly dictum
considering the record in the case and the court's holding. The
record indicated that the FAA manual required the issuance of a
warning by the controller, and that this "duty to warn" was the
only "duty" under consideration by the court. In its holding, the
court acknowledged the existence of the duty to warn in the
manual: "We hold that the controller gave Hartz a warning which
was neither sufficient under the manual nor adequate to caution
Hartz of a possible danger which was then known to the con-
troller."" It seems likely that the court's statement that the duty
of the controller was not circumscribed within the narrow limits
of the manual was addressing the duty to use due care. Certainly
the holding, quoted above, is addressing the due care issue. Ac-
cordingly, the Hartz case is not authority for the proposition that
the duties of a controller extend beyond those established in FAA
manuals.
Another Fifth Circuit decision which has been cited for the
proposition that the duties of a controller are greater than those
prescribed in FAA manuals is American Airlines, Inc. v. United
States." American Airlines involved a 727 airliner that crashed
during a turn while making a night visual approach with rain-
showers in the vicinity of the airport. The trial court found that
neither the FAA nor the National Weather Service were negligent
387 F.2d at 873.
- 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967).
21387 F.2d at 874 (emphasis added).
28 418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969).
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in the performance of their duties. 9 The appellate court agreed with
this conclusion and affirmed the lower court judgment "in all
respects."' Although American contended that the controllers have
duties beyond those set forth in the FAA manuals, the appellate
court made no such finding. The court concluded: "IT]he ultimate
and inescapable result is that pilot error, repeatedly committed,
was the sole proximate cause of this tragic commercial airline
accident."'
In its extensive opinion, the court attempted to summarize the
basic principles of responsibility in air traffic control. It cited two
Fifth Circuit cases: United States v. Schultetus," involving a mid-
air collision in VFR conditions in which the court held that the
pilot retained primary responsibility for the movement of his air-
craft under such conditions; and Hartz. In addition, the court cited
Ingham in support of the Indian Towing concept, that a service
undertaken must be performed with due care. After discussing each
of these cases, the court concluded:
The following standards of duty are to be deduced from Schultetus,
Hartz and Ingham:
1. The pilot in command of the aircraft, is directly responsible
for its operation, and has final authority as to its operation.
2. Before a pilot can be held legally responsible for the movement
of his aircraft he must know or be held to have known, those
facts which were then material to its safe operation. Certainly
the pilot is charged with that knowledge which in the exercise
of the highest degree of care he should have known.
3. The air traffic controller must give the warning specified by the
manuals.
4. The air traffic controller, whether or not required by the man-
uals, must warn of dangers reasonably apparent to him . . .
(but not apparent, in the exercise of due care, to the pilot).
5. Determined by the facts of the particular case, due care may
require an air traffic controller, over and beyond the require-
ments of the manuals, to delay clearance for a take-off or a
landing. If, however, a clearance is duly granted the operation
of the aircraft is the sole responsibility of the pilot, with which
2I Id. at 183.
30Id. at 197.
31 Id. at 194.
32 277 F.2d 322 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 828 (1960).
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the air traffic controller is not to interfere except as specifically
required by the FAA Air Traffic Control Manuals.'
Although these standards are certainly dicta in view of the hold-
ing in the case, analysis of them indicates that they support the
proposition that courts are not imposing extra-manual duties on
controllers. Standard Four is the only standard relevant to this
issue.' Requiring controllers to warn of dangers of which they are
aware is almost synonymous with requiring that they exercise due
care, particularly in view of the manual's requirement that they use
their best judgment in situations not covered by it.
Subsequent Fifth Circuit cases which have found negligence on
the part of air traffic controllers have based their findings upon a
lack of due care on the part of the controller in carrying out the
duties prescribed in the manual rather than upon the creation of
duties beyond those required by it. For example, in Todd v. United
States,' the trial court found that a controller was negligent in
giving a pilot a cruise clearance and clearing him for an approach
while the plane was still some distance from the airport over
mountainous terrain and in adverse weather. The court cited the
standards set out in American Airlines, and proposed the addition
of a sixth requirement: "Determined by the facts of the particular
case, due care requires an air traffic controller to issue clearances
in accordance with the FAA manuals, and over and beyond the
requirements of the manuals the clearance issued must be reason-
ably designed to insure the safety of aircraft flight.IM
Other circuits have taken the same approach as the Fifth Circuit
cases already discussed. In a Ninth Circuit case, Furumizo v.
United States,' the United States was held liable for the negligence
of a controller who cleared a light plane for takeoff immediately
after a DC-8. The controller gave the warning required by the
manual, "[c]aution, turbulence, departing DC-8," but did nothing
further when the light aircraft immediately commenced its takeoff.
33 418 F.2d at 193.
4Standards One and Two are directed at the duties of pilots. Standard Three
concerns duties established by the manuals. Standard Five directly addresses the
duty of due care, i.e., the standard of care required in carrying out the duties
prescribed in the manuals.
384 F. Supp. 1284 (M.D. Fla. 1975), afl'd, 553 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1977).
384 F. Supp. at 1291.
37 381 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967).
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In affirming the trial court's finding of controller negligence, the
appellate court specifically refused to consider the trial court's
conclusion that the controller had a duty to go beyond the pro-
visions of the manual and withdraw the takeoff clearance. Rather,
the Ninth Circuit rested its decision on the lower court's finding
that the controller could not rely on having given the initial warn-
ing when he actually saw the light plane start its takeoff in appar-
ent disregard of the warning. The court referred to the directive
in the FAA manual requiring the controller to give the warning
and concluded, "But we do not think this directive [in the manual]
is fully complied with where, although a first warning has been
given, it becomes clear to the controller that another warning is
needed and none is given.' '
In support of its conclusion, the court observed: "[T]he regula-
tions and manual do not make mere automata of the controllers." 9
Nevertheless, the court recognized the limits of controller liability:
[I]t may be (we do not decide) that if, after giving the warning,
the attention of the controllers had been diverted elsewhere,
either by their own duties or even fortuitously, so that they did
not see the Piper start its takeoff in disregard of the warning,
the United States would not be liable.'
The foregoing illustrates that the Furumizo court was addressing
the requirements of due care within the context of the controller's
duty to comply with the procedures in the manual.
The Ninth Circuit again considered this issue in the case of
Stork v. United States,4' which involved the crash of a C-26 twin-
engine transport, chartered to carry a college football team. The
crash occurred when the aircraft attempted to takeoff in weather
conditions described as "zero-zero in fog." Takeoff under these
weather conditions by an aircraft carrying passengers for hire was
a clear violation of applicable Federal Aviation Regulations. '
At issue in the case was whether the tower controller should




41430 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1970).
' Id. at 1107. Takeoff was prohibited under such conditions by 14 C.F.R.
S 42.55 (1978).
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stances. The trial court found: "[U]nder the then existing regula-
tions and instructions, the controllers definitely had the power and
duty to deny clearance....'0 The Ninth Circuit did not specifically
concur with the lower court's conclusion in this regard. The appel-
late court's finding of controller liability was evidently grounded
upon its conclusion that, under the circumstances, the controller
should have been aware that something was wrong. The court
stated:
For the pilot here to request clearance for takeoff under the
circumstances was clear indication to the tower that something was
amiss as a consequence of which the lives of passengers and crew
were in grave danger and that warning was required. Any assump-
tions on which deference to the judgment of the pilot can normally
rest were refuted by the events themselves.
We conclude, as did the District Court, that silence under these
extraordinary circumstances constituted a breach of duty on the
part of air traffic control personnel."
Citing Furumizo, the court re-emphasized that the obvious and
extreme nature of the danger on the facts of the case compelled
the controller to warn the pilot. The court stated that even assum-
ing that the pilot was aware of the fact that clearance talks only
in terms of traffic, his apparent knowledge would not obviate the
need for warning when he was proceeding in the face of extreme
danger known to the tower. ' Although the Stork decision comes
close to imposing extra-manual duties on controllers, an examina-
tion of the case reveals that the Ninth Circuit was simply defining
the requirements of due care in extraordinary circumstances."
Taken together, Furumizo and Stork are strong authority for
the proposition that where the controller is aware that a pilot has
placed his aircraft in a position of imminent peril, the standard
43278 F. Supp. 869, 879 (S.D. Cal. 1967).
"430 F.2d at 1108.
45d.
'16 The Stork court also placed considerable emphasis upon the ambiguity in
the then existing directives concerning whether a clearance to takeoff was an
"official invitation to proceed" that implied something more than clearance from
conflicting traffic. The court noted that prior to passenger boarding, the pilot ex-
pressed the hope to refueling personnel that perhaps the tower wouldn't let him
takeoff. See Stork v. United States, 430 F.2d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1970). It
would appear that this discussion was included to support the court's finding that
the "failure to warn" was a proximate cause of the accident.
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of due care requires that a warning be given and that the warning
be repeated if no response is observed from the pilot. The clear
implication of the Furumizo language, quoted in Stork, that "the
regulations and manual do not make mere automata of the con-
trollers" is that a controller must use common sense (due care) in
carrying out the provisions of the manual. This proposition is not
likely to be disputed; the conflict arises over the issue of whether
an action by a controller was sensible or reasonable under the
circumstances of the case. Nevertheless, such a proposition falls
short of a judicial determination that the duties of a controller are
not prescribed by the relevant FAA publication."
None of the previous cases made mention of the provision in
the Forward of the manual that instructs controllers to use their
best judgment in situations not covered by it. Perhaps these courts
were not referred to this provision by counsel. In any event, it
seems evident that when the Furumizo and Stork courts concluded
that due care required a warning under the circumstances, the
judiciary was imposing the same standard of good judgment con-
templated by the Administrator in the Forward of the manual.
The Fifth and Ninth Circuit cases discussed above are typical
of the approach taken by the courts in determining the scope of
the duties of air traffic controllers. Based upon the foregoing an-
alysis, it can be concluded that the duties of a controller are pre-
scribed in the relevant FAA manuals. In extraordinary circum-
stances, in which a pilot has placed his aircraft in a position of
peril, the knowledge of the controller is relevant in determining
whether his actions met the standard of due care in carrying out
the provisions of the manual.
II. THE BALANCING TEST OF "RELATIVE POSITION"
Given the widely varying fact situations that are involved in
aviation accidents, many courts considering the alleged negligence
of air traffic controllers have tried to establish a method of deter-
mining whether the conduct of the controller met the requisite
47 Other, and more recent, Ninth Circuit cases have cited Furumizo and Stork
for the general proposition that in some situations controllers must give warnings
beyond those specified in FAA manuals. Nevertheless, where these courts have
ultimately found no actionable negligence on the part of the United States, such
statements do not represent conflicts in authority with the foregoing conclusion.
See, e.g., Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222, 226 (9th Cir. 1972).
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standard of due care. A number of these courts have focused on
the relative vantage points and knowledge of the pilot and the con-
troller. Hartz has been widely cited as establishing a "balancing
test" for the determination of controller liability, requiring a court
to ascertain whether the pilot or the controller was in the "superior"
position to evaluate the danger in question.'
In fact, however, any such balancing of relative positions is ir-
relevant to a determination of whether the controller exercised
due care. Moreover, an examination of Hartz reveals that a bal-
ancing test was not employed by the court. Rather, what emerges
from the case is the court's conclusion that a pilot cannot be held
legally responsible for the movement of his aircraft without know-
ing all the material facts." The court stated that the controller was
better qualified than the pilot by "training, experience and vantage
position" to appreciate the dangers to a light aircraft in taking
off too closely behind the DC-7. Although it might be interesting
to challenge the court's conclusion that a control tower operator,
located a mile from the two aircraft, was in a better position to
appreciate the danger of wing-tip vortices than was the experienced
pilot of the Bonanza who was only fifty feet from the DC-7 as it
rushed by the intersection on its takeoff roll, the relevant point is
that the court addressed this issue while considering the duties of
the pilot. Therefore, the appellate court undoubtedly included the
discussion of the "superior position" of the controller to justify
its holding that the pilot was not guilty of any contributory negli-
gence. This conclusion is reinforced by the court's acknowledge-
ment that the FAA manual created a duty to warn the pilot with-
out regard to whether the controller or the pilot was in the superior
position." Accordingly, one cannot conclude that Hartz requires
a balancing determination of "superior position" for purposes of
considering whether a controller used due care.
A further indication that the Fifth Circuit has not established a
balancing test for evaluating the conduct of air traffic controllers
is contained in the opinion of American Airlines. As' discussed
"' See Gill v. United States, 429 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1970), Richardson v.
United States, 372 F. Supp. 921 (N.D. Cal. 1974), and Thinguldstad v. United
States, 343 F. Supp. 551 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
1387 F.2d 873. This proposition supports the holding concerning pilot re-
sponsibility established in Schultetus, supra note 32.
'o See text accompanying note 27 supra.
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above, the court in American Airlines set out five standards in an
effort to summarize the law concerning the respective duties of
pilots and air traffic controllers. In the court's initial opinion the
fourth standard was phrased: "The air traffic controller, whether
or not required by the manuals, must warn of dangers reasonably




On petition for rehearing, the court modified this language to read:
"The air traffic controller, whether or not required by the manuals,
must warn of dangers reasonably apparent to him."' This modifica-
tion suggests that the court rejected an approach involving a bal-
ancing of the relative positions of the pilot and the controller to
evaluate the actions of the controller. Certainly, from a public
policy standpoint, due care should require that a controller issue
a warning anytime he realizes that an aircraft is in a dangerous
position."
A definite, non-balancing approach to evaluating whether a
controller used due care would involve inquiring whether the con-
troller was aware of the danger. The knowledge of the pilot is rele-
vant only to a court's determination of whether the pilot was
contributorily negligent, and whether the alleged negligence of the
FAA controller was a proximate cause of the crash. Other cases
' 418 F.2d at 193.
"Id. at 197.
Consider the following hypothetical situation: a pilot on a night, cross-
country VFR flight calls the tower for landing instructions and states he is un-
familiar with the field. The controller clears the pilot for a straight-in approach
to the runway. The controller is aware of the existence of an unmarked power
line running perpendicular to the runway near its approach end. After the pilot
reports visual sighting of the runway and has been cleared to land, the controller
notices that the plane's approach path seems very low; nevertheless, the con-
troller does not warn the pilot and turns his attention to some administrative
duty. The aircraft hits the wire and crashes.
On these facts a compelling argument can be made that the controller failed
to use the good judgment (due care) required by the manual when faced with a
situation not specifically covered by it, i.e., noticing an aircraft in a hazardous
position. On these facts, few would disagree that due care required a warning.
Varying the fact pattern slightly, by making the flight a local one with an ex-
perienced pilot who was aware of the existence of the wire, should not change the
result. Even if the wires were lighted, due care should require that the controller
issue a warning if he actually observed that the approach was low. Yet use of a
balancing test of "relative position" in the hypothetical just described involving
the experienced pilot compels the result that the controller not be found liable.
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in which courts have considered the relative positions of the pilot
and the controller support this approach."
II. THE NEGLIGENTLY PREPARED WEATHER FORECAST
The FAA Manualr establishes the duties of air traffic control
personnel concerning the dissemination of weather information.
Air traffic controllers, however, are not certified weather briefers,
and their ability to assist pilots- in the area of weather avoidance
consists primarily of providing information as to areas of heavy
precipitation that can be identified on the controller's radar scope.
Flight Service Station personnel, however, are generally certi-
fied weather briefers. They have only limited air traffic control
functions and are engaged primarily in providing pilots with weath-
er briefings and other services.' The forecasts and other informa-
tion used by Flight Service Station personnel in giving weather
briefs to pilots are prepared by the National Weather Service.
Although claims alleging negligence on the part of National
Weather Service personnel in the preparation of weather forecasts
have been rare, an increasing number of suits raising this issue
have been filed in the last two years. The leading case on negligent
forecasting is National Manufacturing Co. v. United States."' In
National Manufacturing the owners of business establishments in
Kansas City, Missouri, sought to hold the Government liable for
extensive flood damage to their properties. The plaintiffs claimed
that forecasts, containing assurances that the Kansas River would
not overflow, were negligently prepared and that they failed to
move certain property to higher ground in reliance on these fore-
casts. The Government raised several defenses, including the "mis-
representation" exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act.' The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals sustained this defense, among
others, and held that forecasting falls within the scope of the mis-
representation exception.
Several years later the Supreme Court, in United States v.
"See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 497 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1974).
M See note 2 supra.
The current Flight Services Handbook was promulgated by FAA Order
7110.10D in September, 1976.
57210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954).
5828 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976).
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Neustadt," considered the misrepresentation exception in a slightly
different context. Neustadt involved an allegedly negligent inspec-
tion of residential property by an FHA official. The plaintiff, the
purchaser of the property, claimed that he had relied upon the
FHA appraisal in agreeing on the purchase price of the house,
and sued under the FTCA to recover the difference between the
purchase price and the market value of the property. Although the
plaintiff prevailed in both the trial court and in the Fourth Circuit,
the Supreme Court held that the misrepresentation exception ap-
plied to the facts of the case.
In its discussion of the misrepresentation exception, the Neu-
stadt Court specifically approved the application of the defense
to the claim of negligent weather forecasting made by the plaintiffs
in National Manufacturing." The Court rejected the argument that
"the bar of [Section]2680(h) does not apply when the gist of the
claim lies in negligence underlying the inaccurate misrepresenta-
tion, i.e., when the claim is phrased as one 'arising out of' negli-
gence rather than 'misrepresentation'.". According to the Court,
"this argument ... is nothing more than an attempt to circumvent
Section 2680(h) by denying that it applies to negligent misrepre-
sentation. '"' The Supreme Court concluded:
To say, as the Fourth Circuit did, that a claim arises out of
"negligence," rather than "misrepresentation," when the loss
suffered by the injured party is caused by the breach of a "specific
duty" owed by the Government to him, i.e., the duty to use due
care in obtaining and communicating information upon which
that party may reasonably be expected to rely in the conduct of
his economic affairs is only to state the traditional and commonly
understood legal definition of the tort of "negligent misrepresenta-
tion." 3
The foregoing analysis of the Court, together with its express ap-
proval of National Manufacturing, supports the conclusion that
a claim alleging negligence in the preparation of an aviation
weather forecast will be defeated by the application of Section
-366 U.S. 696 (1961).
"°National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1954).
61 366 U.S. at 703.
62 Id.
1S Id. at 706.
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2680(h)." The Supreme Court has not, however, specifically de-
cided this issue.
The issue of negligent weather forecasting arose again as a con-
sequence of the impact of Hurricane Audrey on the Louisiana coast
on June 27, 1957. Hundreds of wrongful death actions were filed
against the Federal government alleging negligent forecasting on
the part of the National Weather Service. In the test case, Bartie v.
United States,5 the trial court upheld all of the defenses raised by
the United States, including the misrepresentation exception. The
Fifth Circuit affirmed,"8 stating that the trial court finding that the
United States was not negligent and that plaintiffs had not proved
the requisite proximate cause made it unnecessary to pass, on other
grounds.
The most recent case on this issue, Chanon v. United States,"'
In a footnote to the Neustadt opinion the Supreme Court stated:
Our conclusion neither conflicts with nor impairs the authority
of Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, which held cog-
nizable a Torts Act claim for property damages suffered when a
vessel ran aground as a result of the Coast Guard's allegedly negli-
gent failure to maintain the beacon lamp in a lighthouse. Such a
claim does not "arise out of ... misrepresentation," any more than
does one based upon a motor vehicle operator's negligence in giving
a misleading turn signal. As Dean Prosser has observed, many fa-
miliar forms of negligent conduct may be said to involve an element
of "misrepresentation," in the generic sense of that word, but "[s]o
far as misrepresentation has been treated as giving rise in and of
itself to a distinct cause of action in tort, it has been identified with
the common law action of deceit," and has been confined "very
largely to the invasion of interests of a financial or commercial
character, in the course of business dealings." PROSSER, TORTS,
§ 85, "Remedies for Misrepresentation," at 702-703 (1941). See
also 2 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS, § 29.13, at 1655 (1956).
366 U.S. at 711 n.26.
Some have argued that Dean Prosser's analysis of misrepresentation, as quot-
ed by the Court, introduces uncertainty into the issue of whether Section 2680(h)
bars government liability for negligent weather forecasting. Examination of the
Court's discussion of Indian Towing and of Dean Prosser's reference to the com-
mon law action of deceit suggests, however, no necessary contradiction between
the holding in Neustadt and the language of the footnote. As to common law ac-
tions of deceit, Theodore Plucknett, in his A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAw at 640-43 (5th ed. 1956), states that such actions were expanded in the
fifteenth century to include claims of nonfeasance and in the following century
to encompass liability for a defendant who failed to keep a promise he had made
although he in no way profited from the plaintiff's injury.
216 F. Supp. 10 (W.D. La. 1963).
* 326 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 852 (1964).
17 350 F. Supp. 1039 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 480 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1973).
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involved the deaths of two seamen who drowned when their boat
sank during a storm in the Gulf of Mexico. The plaintiff's alleged
that the National Weather Service had negligently prepared and
disseminated the weather forecast in issue. Citing Indian Towing,
the trial court concluded that the National Weather Service "was
under the duty to use due care in gathering weather information,
forecasing, and making available for broadcasting up-to-date
weather information."" On the facts of the case, however, the court
found that there was no negligence on the part of the government
in the preparation or dissemination of the forecasts. As a result,
the court did not pass on the issue of whether Section 2680(h) of
the FTCA provides an absolute defense for the United States in
such circumstances. The issue was raised on appeal, but the Fifth
Circuit held that the district court's finding that the government
was not negligent provided a sufficient basis for affirming the case
without reaching the issue of the applicability of the misrepresenta-
tion defense."'
Although no appellate court since the Neustadt opinion has
addressed the issue of whether the misrepresentation exception of
the FTCA provides an absolute defense to the government in cases
alleging negligence in the preparation of weather forecasts, there
are currently a half-dozen cases awaiting decision in which this
issue has been raised.M Should any of these courts conclude that
National Weather Service personnel were negligent in making their
forecasts, an appellate court will be forced to consider the mis-
representation defense.
CONCLUSION
There can no longer be any question that the operation of the
air traffic control system, including the accurate dissemination of
weather information as well as the actual control of air traffic,
exposes the government to liability for any failure of FAA per-
sonnel to exercise due care in the performance of their duties. The
1' 350 F. Supp. at 1041.
"480 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1973).
70 The government also has raised the additional defense that the duties of
National Weather Service personnel run to the general public, but not to specific
individuals. See National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263, 279; cf. Cle-
mente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140 (Ist Cir. 1977).
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scope of these duties is defined by the provisions of the relevant
FAA manuals. In unusual situations, not contemplated by the
manual, these personnel are required to exercise "their best judg-
ment."
Since 1954, no appellate court has considered whether the mis-
representation provision of Section 2680(h) of the FTCA provides
an absolute defense to the government in claims arising from an
allegedly negligent weather forecast. Prevailing, yet dated, prece-
dents suggest that the exception bars governmental liability for
negligent forecasting.

